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Abstract
In this paper, I study decision theory in the presence of imperfect
recall. I use an extension of the standard strategy concept for the
analysis of extensive form games in order to examine the range of
imperfect recall problems for which there exists an optimal solution.
Optimality is assessed in terms of perfect recall problems associated
to their corresponding imperfect recall problems.
Összefoglaló
Ebben a tanulmányban kísérletet teszek azon döntési problémák
körének meghatározására, amelykben a döntéshozó memóriája nem
tökéletes. Ezek egy részét a hagyományos stratégia fogalom
segítségével nem lehet megoldani, csak egy új, kibõvített koncepció
vezethet optimális döntésekhez ilyen helyzetekben. Ehhez a
vizsgálathoz meghatározom azt is, hogy mit jelent egy döntési
probléma megoldása, ha felejtés is lehetséges benne.1. Introduction
When Piccione and Rubinstein [1994] recently took up the issue of how to
analyze decision problems with imperfect recall, they almost had to start
the discourse from the state it was left in the fifties. They set out to catalog
the difficulties which may have prevented others to write on this topic. As
their work reveals, the difficulties in the analysis of imperfect recall are not
simply due to technical complexities or the vagueness surrounding the
identity of players. Many concepts, techniques and approaches which serve
as cornerstones for contemporary decision and game theory do not perform
well in the presence of imperfect recall.
Their attention was limited to decision theory, as a natural first step. It
could be asserted that they made five main observations about the
interpretation of decision theory with imperfect recall. The first registers
the need of employing behavioral strategies to solve some imperfect recall
problems. This result has been already pointed out by Isbell [1957], but
Piccione and Rubinstein identify additional ambiguities in interpreting
behavioral strategies in imperfect recall contexts. Second, they point out
that an instance of time inconsistency appears in several cases, which is
not due to preference changes. Third, urged by the previous observation,
they examine the possibility of interpreting imperfect recall problems as
the interaction of several temporal selves. This, too, leaves substantial
ambiguities in the analysis. Fourth, they discuss how to model the beliefs
of the decision maker while he is in the middle of the problem. Finally,
they consider the case when the decision maker may even forget his own
strategy, and therewith yet an other set of interpretational dilemmas
appears.The analysis undertaken in this paper is grounded in the thesis that
these five ambiguities are all tied to a further one, the ambiguity of the
strategy concept in situations riddled with imperfect recall. The following
simple example can give a partial illustration.
Figure 1-a exhibits a decision problem with imperfect recall. At the
information set I3, the decision maker forgot what the previous chance
move was, something he could have known at either I1 or I2. Now suppose
that the strategy he formed at the beginning prescribes to do L at I3. Then if
he would end up being at I2, he should opt for O there. However, if at d4 in
I3, he could indeed do R, then we may say that he should not take O at I2.
But a strategy prescribes the same action for each of the vertices in an
information set, so he at I2 cannot hope that later at d4 in I3  the right
decision will be made. Then at I2 there is a reason to change the strategy
formulated at the beginning. Suppose that this was indeed possible. Then is
it not the case that at I3 he can deduce from the fact that the strategy has
changed where he is exactly, at d3 or at d4? So can we allow for changing
strategy in the middle of the problem? What can the decision maker know
about his later ability to comply with such a change? None of these
questions concerning what strategies in imperfect recall problems are
would arise in a perfect recall context.
This paper presents a model of imperfect recall decision problems, and
this model underwrites one sort of analysis. This model is comprehensive
enough to address all the five ambiguities pointed out by Piccione and
Rubinstein. I analyze decision problems with imperfect recall with the help
of a strategy concept which is an extension of the standard one introducedby von Neumann and Morgenstern and later canonized by Kuhn [1953]
1.
At the same time, the range of the beliefs of the decision maker is reduced
in this model, no more is assumed about his epistemic abilities than that he
has a capacity to recognize information sets and to carry out the
instructions inscribed in the strategy which he constructed at the time he
was confronted with the problem. This is helpful for the examination of
problems featuring forgetting: assuming less rather than more about the
cognitive abilities of the agent should only help the clarification of what is
at the core of the difficulties in analyzing these sorts of situations. Then I
set out to show what the employment of the extended strategy concept can
achieve in our context by first establishing a benchmark to which solutions
to imperfect recall problems should be compared. This entails the
construction of associated perfect recall problems to each imperfect recall
problems, and the identification of the best standard strategy which can
provide the optimal solution to these derived problems. Then I show that
optimal extended strategies can attain the optimum for a large set of
problems, in the sense of inducing the outcome which the optimal standard
strategy for the associated problem would be able to induce. I also report a
full characterization of optimal extended strategies for an important class
of problems. - The introduction of the concept of extended strategies may
also be used to demarcate the boundary between imperfect recall problems
as they relate to individuals as opposed to teams.
Of course, other approaches are also possible and promising. Battigalli
([1995], [1996]) studies time inconsistency in the context of imperfect
recall problems, where he conceives of these problems as coordination
                                                
1 I introduced this concept in my [1994)] "An Analysis of Decision Problems in Time".
Since then, Joseph Halpern has independently identified a virtually identical concept,games between temporal/modal selves. Halpern ([1995], [1996]) situates
the current problem in a comprehensive framework of decision theory and
intertemporal knowledge
2. I give a partial assessment of these and other
approaches in my (1996: §§ 23–28, 31–34), paper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I
present a model of decision problems with imperfect recall and clarify the
strategy concept by means of which I will analyze the best solution to these
problems.  Section 3 describes the method of the analysis and reports
results of a preliminary investigation. Section 4 introduces associated
perfect recall problems and optimal extended strategies. Section 5 presents
results about optimal solutions for certain classes of problems, and section
6 offers concluding remarks.
2. The Model
This section is devoted to the description of a formal model of decision
problems, and therewith a formal model of decision problems with
imperfect recall. Also, it specifies the strategy concept by means of which
these decision problems may be solved.
2.1. Basic Assumptions
The analysis is restricted to one-shot decision problems, that is to those
which are not instances of a recurrent set of identical problems.
                                                                                                                                              
see Halpern ([1995], [1996]).The description of the physical problem starts by positing the set of
possible histories H in a decision problem (which has generic elements
h ∈  H).
3 These histories are constructed as sequences of individual basic




= 1, where the superscript k locates an individual action in the
sequence. Thus, for example, a
k marks out the basic action ai, where ai ∈
A. Then we say that ai is part of the history h. So we can regard the set A as
a set of types of actions, and their occurrence in a sequence individuates
them as an action token. The set of action tokens is denoted by  A, and
thus we can also say that an action token a
k is part of a certain history h.
The set H is assumed to be finite here. It further has to meet the
following two requirements. First, 0 ∈  H, that is the empty sequence called
the initial history is an element of H. Second, if (a
k) k
K
= 1 ∈  H and (a
k) k
K







1 ∈  H.
Finally, if for H a h = (a
k) k
K
= 1 ∈  H there is no ai such that (h, ai) ∈  H
then that history is called a terminal history. The set of terminal histories is
denoted by Z, this set then represents all the courses of action available to
the decision maker.
It seems to be useful to embed the formulation above into an other one
which admits the mathematical object of a graph, more specifically a tree
(for the current purposes a connected graph without cycles). In this second
formulation, the basic primitive object is a finite tree Γ  = 〈 H, A〉 . The
vertices of this tree correspond to the elements of H, the edges correspond
                                                                                                                                              
2  I would like to call attention to the possibility of employing the concept of 'signalling
information set' as well; see Thompson [1953]. Cf. von Neumann–Morgenstern
([1944] [1947]: 51–54).
3 This part of the presentation of the physical problem corresponds to the approach
recommended by Osborne and Rubinstein ([1994]: 89–90, 200–202).to the set of action tokens A. The initial history 0 ∈  H will be represented
by the root of the tree.
From this it follows that edges represent individuated actions, and two
distinct edges may stand for the same action from the set A. We can
naturally write h' = (h, ai), where ai is the name of the action attached to
the edge (a mathematical object) adjacent to both h and h'. Notice that
histories became separate entities here, by being vertices, but the elements
in the set H can be identified as sequences of actions as well. In this
geometrical picture we can see a sequence of actions construing a history
as the sequence of edges from the root of the tree to the history in question
as well.
If for a h = (a
k) k
K
= 1 ∈  H  there is no ai such that (h, ai) ∈  H, then that
history is called a terminal history. The set of terminal histories is denoted
by Z, this set then represents all the courses of action available to the
decision maker. Next, let the A(h) = (ai  (h, ai) ∈  H),denote the set of
feasible actions after history h. Then we can redefine terminal histories as
histories for which A(h) is empty. It is further required that  ∀ h ∈  H \ Z,
A(h) is non-singleton.
A player assignment function R : H \ Z →  {chance, DM}, where DM
denotes the decision maker, divides further the histories in H  \ Z. The
interpretation of this function R(.) is immediate, it prescribes the action of
either chance (Nature) or the decision maker after each non-terminal
histories.  R(.) essentially partitions the non-terminal histories: histories
when the decision maker is on the move are elements of the set D (the set
D could be called the set of decision histories, histories when chance is on
the move are elements of the set C.For each history in C there is an assignment of a (strictly positive)
probability with which the feasible actions after that history could occur,
and these probabilities are known to the decision maker and will be never
forgotten. We do not need to formalize this further, and since no
substantial role will be played by this probability assignment here we can
denote these probabilities by fc and leave them like that. Sometimes I will
distinguish chance moves by the symbol α .
So the physical problem can be summarized now as a tuple 〈 H, R, fc〉 .
Note that this is only a shorthand for the full characterization by the tuple
〈 Γ , R,  fc〉 , or 〈 H, A R,  fc〉 . Below, I will always use 〈 H, R,  fc〉 , for
convenience.
The preferences of the decision maker are described by the function
u : Z →  ℜ  which attaches a utility index to each terminal history. Recalling
that  H is finite shows that the sidestepping of a more primitive
construction of preferences by the direct positing of utility indices is
natural. It will be further assumed that preferences do not change during
the course of the problem.
Next we have to specify the beliefs of the decision maker. Beliefs
about location within the problems are captured by the concept of
information sets. Information sets are members of a partition I  (with
generic element I) on the set of decision vertices D. (Denote by |I| the
number of histories in a given information set I.) This then stipulates that if
the decision maker is at a history h, he will not be able to distinguish
among the histories which are contained in that element of I of which h is a
member. Further, for the same reasons, the decision maker cannot be able
to distinguish individual actions as identified by the history at which they
have to be committed. If this was not so, then histories could be identifiedby the actions available. This requires that for all h and h' in an information
set I, A(h) = A(h'). For the sake of consistency, one needs to stipulate also
that a given type of action ai cannot occur at more than one information
set; that is there is no h ∈  I and h' ∈   I'  I  ≠  I', such that ai  ∈  A(h) and ai  ∈
A(h').
Thus, the description of the whole extensive form decision problem is
now complete. This can be summarized by the tuple 〈 H, R, fc I, u〉 . Let us
say that the tuple ∆  = 〈 H, R, I〉  stands for the extensive form. (Note that
this definition is different from the standard one in that it omits fc. This
omission is justified by the fact that no substantial role is played by these
probabilities in the current discussion.)
2.2. Definitions for Some Imperfect Recall Extensive Forms
Decision problems can be classified in terms of the properties of their
extensive form. Moreover, we can define a decision problem with
imperfect recall in terms of these properties. As a preparation for future
analysis, we have to introduce first several clusters of auxiliary concepts.
In order to give proper definitions, we have to first introduce some
auxiliary notions. Let us identify a set of relations on the object 〈 H, R, I〉 .
The first of these is the initial subhistory relation, denoted by P. It is
defined on the set H as: h'Ph if and only if when h = (a
k) k
K





L < K. We also write h' ∈  P(h). The inverse of this relation is denoted by S,
and hSh'  if and only if h'Ph. We write h ∈  S(h') accordingly. In graph-
theoretical terms, P is the predecessor relation, and S is the successor










1. We also write h' = p(h). The inverse of this
relation is denoted by s, and hsh' if and only if h'ph, and we may writeh∈   s(h') accordingly. In graph-theoretical terms, p is the immediate
predecessor relation, and s is the immediate successor relation. Finally, we
will make use of a further relation, called the subhistory relation, denoted
by Q. The definition of this invokes the fact that histories can be identified
as sequences of actions. We say that Q(h) = (a
k) k
L
= 1 is a subhistory of
 h = (a
k) k
K
= 1, if two conditions are met. First, each a




has to designate the same action ai as some a
k'' which is part of
h =  (a
k) k
K
= 1. Second, if two action tokens a
k' and a
k''' are part of Q(h), and
they correspond to a
k'' and a
k'''' in h, respectively: then a
k' and a
k''' preserve
the same order in Q(h) as a
k'' and a
k'''' had in the sequence h.
The various relations defined above should be extended for the sake of
the coming analysis to the set of information sets. Due to the nature of the
object  〈 H, R, I〉 , there are several legitimate extensions. The following two
are adopted. For two information sets I and I', I' precedes I, that is I'PI if
and only if ∃ h' ∈  I' and ∃ h ∈  I such that h'Ph. We can write I' ∈  P(I), and
the inverse relation S is naturally defined. Similarly, for two information
sets I and I', I' immediately precedes I, that is I'pI if and only if ∃ h' ∈  I' and
∃ h ∈  I such that h'ph. We can write I' ∈  P(I), and, again, the inverse
relation  s is naturally defined. The employment of the same letter for
denoting these relations between information sets as those between
histories is justified by the fact that we recognize only one extension. For
the remaining case of predecessor relations between histories and
information sets, note that histories can be viewed as singleton information
sets.A second set of auxiliary concepts involves the idea of experience,
introduced by Osborne and Rubinstein
4. The experience of actions of the




= 1 which is a subhistory of h = (a
k) k
K
= 1, and is such that ∀ a
l'
which is part of (a
l) l
L
= 1,  ∃ h'  ∈   P(h)  ∩   D such that the action ai
corresponding to a




that subsequence of h which is constituted by actions made previously by
the decision maker, as opposed to chance. Similarly, W(h) = (α
m) m
M
= 1 is the
chance experience at h∈ D. Here (α
m) m
M
= 1 is a subhistory of (a
k) k
K
= 1, and for
∀ α
m'  part of (α
m) m
M
= 1, ∃ c ∈  P(h) ∩  C such that α
m' ∈  A(c). Thus this is the
subsequence of h made up of the chance moves in it. This latter concept
will not be employed in the current subsection, but some use will be made
of it in the subsequent discussion.
The most important concept in this cluster is the experience of the






L) This sequence has the following properties. The elements a
l
are just the elements of V(h). And the elements I
l are the elements of Y(h),
the sequence making up the experience of information sets. This sequence
is defined as follows. For l < L, I
l is such that if a
l+1 is in (I
l, a
l+1) which is
part of X(h), and further if a
l+1 ∈  A(h') for some h' ∈  P(h) ∩  D: then h' ∈ I
l.
Finally, I
L is the information set which contains h.
Recall that an extensive form decision problem is a tuplet ∆  = 〈 H, R, fc,
I, u〉  and that H may stand for a finite tree or for a finite set of histories.
Again, for our purposes, the extensive form ∆  = 〈 H, R, I〉  can suitably
represent a given decision problem. It is useful to identify then a last group
                                                
4 See Osborne–Rubinstein ([1994]: 203), and also Piccione–Rubinstein ([1994]: 9–10.)of auxiliary concepts which refer to subproblems of an extensive form ∆ .




h, the set of histories H
h consist of h and ∀  h' ∈  H such that h' ∈  S(h).
The player assignment function R
h is the projection of R on H
h. Similarly,
the information partition I
h is the projection of  I on H
h. Formally, I
h =
(I ∈ | I ∩  H
h ≠   0). There is further a partition I s
h of immediate successors of
h, a projection of I on the set H s
h for which it is true that  ∀ h' ∈  H s
h,
h' ∈  s(h). The second kind of subproblem is that of the information set
induced (I-induced) subproblem, denoted by ∆
I, which is defined, with a
slight abuse of notation, as ∪ h∈ I∆
h . For a more precise definition one
would have to first define the union operation on subproblems. Finally, we
have the action induced (ai-induced) subproblems, denoted by ∆
aн  This
consists of action tokens corresponding to ai and ∪ {h|∃ h':ai∈ A(h'),(h',ai=h}∆
h.
An additional, but related concept is containment. Here consider some ∆
h.
Then if for some I ∈   I
h and for ∀ h' ∈  I we have h' ∈  ∆
h, we say that I is
con-tained in that∆








= 1. An information set I is said to be multi-staged, if ∀ h, h' such that
h ∈  I and h' ∈  I, we have l(h) = l(h').
Now we identify certain classes of extensive form decision problems.
All these classes are related to properties of the extensive form ∆  = 〈 H, R, I〉 .
                                                
5 Note that the symbol ∆  is used both for denoting extensive forms and subproblems,
and thus is employed for the reference to somewhat dissimilar mathematical objects.DEFINITION 1: The following is a list of classes of decision problems in
extensive form:
•   An extensive form decision problem features perfect information, if each
information set in ∆  is singleton.
•   An extensive form decision problem features perfect recall if for ∀ h, h', I
such that h∈  I and h' ∈  I, we have X(h) = X(h'). Otherwise it features
imperfect recall.
•   An extensive form decision problem features perfect recall of
information sets, if for ∀  h, h', I such that h ∈  I and h' ∈  I, we have Y(h)
= Y(h').
•    An extensive form decision problem is multi-staged, if each of its
information sets are multi-staged.
•   An extensive form decision problem features cross-branch relevance, if
there exists I ∈  ∆  such that ∃  I' ∈  ∆
I which is not contained in ∆
I or if
there exists c ∈  ∆  such that ∃  I' ∈  ∆
c which is not contained in  ∆
c.
•   An extensive form decision problem features absent-mindedness, if
∃  I ∈  I and ∃ h, h' ∈   I, such that h ∈   S(h').
Most of these concepts are adapted from earlier works and I retained
the original name for them. The concept of perfect information decision
problem is standard. The current definition of perfect recall is the same as
in  Osborne–Rubinstein ([1994]: 203). The concept of perfect recall of
information sets and absent-mindedness appears in Piccione–Rubinstein
([1994]: 9–10), see Figures 2-a and 3 for examples of each of them. Figure
4 shows a decision problem with cross-branch relevance.
2.3. Strategies, Extended Strategies, and Basic Interpretation
After having presented the basic model, I need to specify the means by
which the decision maker may try to solve a particular imperfect recall
decision problem. The standard tool for the implementation of the bestcourse of action is a strategy, which is defined as a function σ  : I →  A,
where the range is subject to familiar restrictions. I will refer to this
concept as simple strategy. Denote by Σ  the set of all such simple
strategies. For the sake of simplicity, I assume that mixed strategies cannot
be employed: this will not affect the forthcoming results.
This paper recognizes an extension of the concept of the simple
strategy, which allows the updating of a current strategy during the
problem. This, a new object, is called extended strategy, and it is defined
by the function θ  : I  ×  Σ  →  Α  ×  Σ  where Θ  is the set of which θ  is the
generic element. Here the same restriction applies to A as above. Extended
strategies are formed before the first move of the decision maker, and
prescribe two operations for each information set. The first operation is the
carrying out of instructions according to the strategy regarded as valid, the
second operation is contingent on the information set and may call for the
specification of a new valid strategy. This new strategy is then passed on to
the next information set in which a decision is to be made and which is to
be reached next, given the action just committed. There this new strategy
will be regarded as valid. Finally, at the outset, an initial strategy is
prescribed, which we may denote by σ 0.
The difference between the two strategy concepts can be brought out
by  a reference to a well-known explication of what strategies are in a
perfect recall context, according to which simple strategies are individual
pocket books (Kuhn [1953]). Now extended strategies can be conceived of
as a collection of pocket books, and rule prescribing when they should be
used. For further discussion of the concept of extended strategies, see my
([1996]: §§ 23–28, 31–34), paper.An analysis in this framework admitting extended strategies could be
conducted in two steps. First, in a reduced account of a decision problem,
temporal/modal selves within the problem could be deprived of much of
their epistemic resources, without abandoning the basic structure of the
problem. In this reduced account, selves are only capable of recognizing
the information set they are in, and carrying out instructions inscribed in
the strategy. In an analysis of imperfect recall, assuming less rather than
more about beliefs can only be helpful
6. In a second step, one could relax
the assumption that decision makers have no epistemic life within the
problem, and seek the corresponding definition of extended strategies in
this case. The analysis would then be completely analogous to the one for
the first case. The present interpretation independently justifies why it was
sufficient to describe the beliefs of the decision maker by the set of
information sets. All what is assumed of their beliefs is that agents are
capable of identifying information sets and of following the instructions
inscribed in an extended strategy. This, finally, also fixes the interpretation
of beliefs concerning what the strategy is, there is no problem with strategy
recall here.
3. Preliminary Analysis
In this section, I start the formal analysis of imperfect recall decision
problems. Let me first outline the strategy for this analysis. The aim is to
                                                
6 Note that if the privilege of having epistemic states will be withdrawn from the
decision maker while he is in the middle of the problem, the strategy employed by
him can be characterized as part of a description of a finite automaton solving the
problem.demonstrate how to solve imperfect recall problems and to specify when
such a solution requires the employment of extended strategies. So the
analysis seeks to identify the conditions under which there is an optimal
extended strategy for some class of imperfect recall problems. The precise
meaning of  'optimal' will be specified formally in subsection 4.2, but we
can already say that it deserves to be called optimal since it manages to
implement the best course of action discernible at the beginning of the
problem.
In this paper I will examine only one specific class of decision
problems in extensive form. These problems, called Bayesian decision
problems have either no chance vertex in them, or if they have one, then
that is the root of the decision tree
7.
In order to reach the conclusions, much preliminary work has to be
done. To set up a criterion for the optimality of the solution of these
problems via extended strategies (the topic of subsection 4.2), I will show
how to construct associated perfect recall problems to each such imperfect
recall problem in subsection 4.1. In turn, this construction will make use of
a characterization of relevant perfect recall decision problems, which will
be presented in subsections 3.1 and 3.2 below. In subsection 3.4, I describe
what optimal strategies for these perfect recall problems are and introduce
a tool for their examination. So most of the forthcoming analysis in the
next two sections is preparation for the results in Section 5, which, taken
together, state that there is an optimal extended strategy for a series of
important classes of imperfect recall problems. – In addition, I present a
                                                
7 Note that this class includes the problems defined as "Bayesian" by Piccione and
Rubinstein ([1994]: 18).characterization of a class of imperfect recall problems in subsection 3.3,
which prepares further work in Section 5.
3.1. A Characterization of Bayesian Perfect Recall Problems
In this subsection, I give a characterization of Bayesian perfect recall
decision problems.
LEMMA 1: A Bayesian perfect recall problem is multi-staged.
Proof: Take any information set I and h, h' ∈  I. Then, by hypothesis,
V(h) = V(h') and further, W(h) = W(h') = c or W(h) = W(h') = 0. Therefore
l(h) = l(h'). 
Now we proceed via an induction on the cardinality of the set C in δ .
(i) If C is empty, then δ  is a perfect information problem and therefore
each information set in δ  is singleton, by Definition 1.
(ii)} If C is singleton, then we know that the chance vertex is at the
root of the decision tree. Recall next the definition of the experience of
actions V(h) at a given history h. Now a new sequence, the experience of
actions after the chance history c is constructed. This sequence V
c(h) is
defined as that sequence (a
l) l
L
= 1 which is a subhistory of h = (a
k) k
K
= 1, and is
such that  ∀ a
l' which is part of (a
l) l
L
= 1, ∃ h' ∈  P(h) ∩  D, h' ∈  δ
c such that the
action ai corresponding to a
l' is in A(h').
First, we convert the definition of perfect recall into a suggestive
simple lemma:
LEMMA 2: In a Bayesian perfect recall problem with a chance vertex, ∀  I
in δ , ∀ h, h' ∈  I: V
c(h) = V




This simple observation should be supplemented by the following two
results:
LEMMA 3: In a Bayesian perfect recall problem with a chance vertex, ∀
I, if I ∈  I
I'such that I' is in δ , then it is contained in δ
 I'.
Proof: Suppose for a contradiction that there is h ∈  I, I ∈  I
I, but h is
not in δ
I. Then there also exists h' not in δ
I' and ai part of h such that ai ∈
A(h') and for all h'' ∈  I', l (h') = l(h''). But therefore for a h''' ∈  I, h''' ∈  δ
I':
X(h) ≠   X(h'''), which violates perfect recall. 
LEMMA 4: In a Bayesian perfect recall problem with a chance vertex, if
∃ h ∈  I in I of δ  and ai  is part of h, then I is contained in δ ai.
Proof: Suppose there is h ∈  I in I of δ , and ai part of h, for which I is
not contained in δ ai. Consider an other h'  ∈  I. But then ai is part of V
c(h)
but not of V
c(h'), which is impossible by Lemma 2. 
3.2. Resolution of Uncertainty in Perfect Recall Problems
Let us here introduce an other set of auxiliary concepts which refer to
uncertainty resolution. Uncertainty resolution is relative to the chance
vertex c ∈  C in some Bayesian perfect recall problem, if it exists. Define
A(c) = (α   (c, α ) ∈  H). Then for ∀ I ∈ {ΙΙΙΙ } of δ , define AI(c) = (α   (c, α ) ∈  H
and ∃ h ∈  I: h ∈  δ
α ). Clearly, AI(c) ⊆  A(c). An information set I ∈  ΙΙΙΙ  of δ  is
fully uncertainty resolving if AI(c) is singleton and whenever ∃ I' ∈  ΙΙΙΙ  of δ
such that I' ∈  P(I), then AI(c) is not singleton. A non-singleton information
set  I  ∈   ΙΙΙΙ  of δ  is partially uncertainty resolving if |AI(c)| < |A(c)|, andwhenever ∃ I' ∈ ΙΙΙΙ  of δ  such that I' ∈  P(I), then | AI(c)| < | AI'(c)|. We also say
that if an information set is either fully or partially uncertainty resolving,
then it is uncertainty resolving.
Now some further characteristics can be read off the following
corollaries, which may provide useful tests for the procedure of
constructing perfect recall problems associated to Bayesian imperfect
recall problems, to be described in subsection 4.1.
COROLLARY 1: In a Bayesian perfect recall problem with one chance
vertex, for ∀  I, I'∈  I of δ , if I ∈  I
I', |I| ≤  |I'|.
Proof: Recall that by Lemma 2, for all h, h' in I ∈  I of δ  : V
c(h) = V
c(h').
That is they can differ only in their chance experience within δ.  This,
because of Lemma 4, establishes that for ∀  I ∈  I of δ,  |I| = |AI (c)|. (AI (c)
was defined above).
Next, recognize that |AI(c)| ≤  |AI'(c)|.Suppose for a contradiction that on
the contrary, |AI(c)| >|AI'(c)|. So there exists  α∈  AI(c) which is not in AI'(c).
Then while ∃ h ∈  I which is in δ
α , there is h' ∈  I' which is not in δ
α . But by
Lemma 3, each h ∈  I is in δ
I', which leads to the contradiction.
Now since |I| = |AI(c)| ≤ |AI'(c)|.= |I'|, the statement of the lemma is true. 
This implies two immediate further corollaries:
COROLLARY 2: In a Bayesian perfect recall problem with one chance
vertex, if I ∈  I s
c  is singleton, then ∀  I ' ∈  I' is singleton.
and
COROLLARY 3: In a Bayesian perfect recall problem with one chance
vertex, if for I, I' ∈  I of δ : |I| < |I'| and I ∈  s(I'), then I is uncertainty
resolving. If further I is singleton, then it is fully uncertainty resolving.The content of Corollaries 1 to 3 can be summarized in the following
statement: in a Bayesian decision problem with perfect recall and one
chance vertex, no uncertainty resolving information set is forgotten again.
3.3.Characterization of Problems with Regular Imperfect Recall of
Information Sets
As a digression to the main argument of the current section, but also as a
preparation for future analysis in subsection 5.2, let us juxtapose to the just
finished characterization an other one, that of a class of imperfect recall
problems. This class is the closest conceivable to the class of Bayesian
perfect recall problems, in the appropriate sense. So:
DEFINITION 2: The class of Bayesian decision problems with perfect
recall of information sets which are multi-staged and do not feature cross-
branch relevance, is the class of problems with regular perfect recall of
information sets.
Already a first acquaintance with this definition delivers a set of
immediate observations, which will be presented in the form of a lemma,
for the sake of future reference:
LEMMA 5: For problems with regular perfect recall of information sets it
is true that: ∀ I ∈  I of δ , if I ∈  I
I' such that I' ∈  I of δ , then it is contained in
δ
I'.
Proof: It follows immediately from Definitions 1 and 2. 
It is important to recognize that this lemma is a counterpart of Lemma 3
in the characterization of Bayesian perfect recall problems. Similarly, the
next observation is the counterpart of the previous Lemma 4:LEMMA 6: There exist problems with regular perfect recall of
information sets such that it is not true that if ∃  h ∈  I in I of δ  and ai is part
of h, then I is contained in δ ai.
Proof: Suppose for a contradiction that the statement is false. Then
Figure 2-a provides a counterexample. 
Now we are prepared for the same kind of inductive characterization of
this class of problems as was employed in the case of perfect recall. The
induction is on the cardinality of the set C.
 (i) If C is empty, then while it could be the case that if ∃ h ∈  I in I of δ
and ai is part of h, then I is not contained in δ ai, it is always the case that if
I ΙΙΙΙ
I' such that I' ∈  I of δ , then it is contained in δ
I'.
(ii) If C is singleton, the problem δ  is characterized by Lemmas 5 and 6.
Clearly, this class can be regarded as the ``closest" to the class of
Bayesian perfect recall problems in the sense that with the exception of the
property recorded in Lemma 4, these problems match all the properties of
the latter class.
3.4. Implementation Graphs
Let us return to the examination of Bayesian perfect recall problems. What
is the optimal simple strategy for them? Take such a decision problem δ .
The optimal strategy σ
* has to fulfill the requirement:
σ
* ∈  argmaxU (δ ) = 
zZ ∈∑ p(z | σ ) u(z)
Here p(z | σ ) stands for the probability that the terminal history z is
reached if σ  is adopted, and is derived appropriately from fc. We make thefurther assumption that there is only one optimal strategy for a given
problem. This assumption is innocuous in the present context, its violation
would only complicate the analysis without giving sufficient new insights.
Let us denote by I
* the collection of information sets which could be
reached during the implementation of the optimal strategy σ
*8. Similarly, if
there is a chance vertex in the problem, record that fact. Then let us
construct the implementation graph Γ
*, the graph of I
* and c (if it exists),
in the following way. The vertices of Γ
* are the information sets in I
* and
the chance vertex c (if it exists), while the edges are the actions prescribed
by σ
* or the moves after c (if it exists). This construction leads then to a
derived relation s
* on Γ
* which is defined formally below.
We draw an edge from some c to an I ∈  I
*, or Is
*c, if ∃ h ∈  I and
∃α  ∈  A(c) such that (c,α ) = h. When should we draw an edge from an
I ∈  I
* to an other vertex on Γ
*, I' ∈  I
*; that is when is it the case that I's
*I?
Whenever σ




* are analogously defined.
Finally, let us make it clear that the vertices of  Γ
* keep the labels they
had on Γ . Figure 5 illustrates the derivation of  Γ
* on an example.
The following lemma describes this implementation graph.
LEMMA 7: Γ
* is a tree.
Proof: First, note that  Γ
* is connected by the s
* relation. Second, there
can be no cycles on this graph, since by Lemma 2, there is no I in δ  for
which I ∈  S(I) and therefore I ∈  S
*(I) is not possible. 
                                                
8 It is a straightforward task to give a succinct description of the derivation of I*, but
this is omitted here.It is in terms of this graph    Γ
*  that we define our concepts of
branching. An information set I ∈  I
* is called a branching information set
if  s
*(I) is non-singleton. The chance vertex c (if it exists) is called a
branching chance vertex if s
*(c) is non-singleton. The optimal strategy σ
*
is branching, if it involves at least one branching information set or chance
vertex.
LEMMA 8: I is a branching information set if and only if its immediate
successors on Γ
* are uncertainty resolving. And c is a branching chance
vertex if and only if its immediate successors on Γ
* are uncertainty
resolving.
Proof:  Suppose first that c on Γ
* is branching, but there is an I' among
its immediate successors there which is not uncertainty resolving. So
I' ∈  I s
c on Γ  and there is an other I'' ∈  I s
c since c is branching. Then
AI'(c) ≠  AI''(c) and none of them are empty. Therefore |AI'(c))| < |A(c)|, thus
I' is indeed uncertainty resolving by Corollary 3.
Suppose next that I on Γ
*  is branching, but there is an I' among its
immediate successors there which is not uncertainty resolving. Again,
 I' ∈  I s
I on Γ  and there is an other I'' ∈  I s
I since I is branching. Also,
 AI'(c) ≠  AI''(c), by Lemma 4, and none of them are empty. Then there is an
α   ∈   A(c), such that α   ∈   AI(c),  α   ∈   AI''(c), but it is not the case that 
α  ∈  AI'(c). But then |AI'(c)| < |AI(c),| and thus I' is uncertainty resolving.
For the reverse, suppose first that I' ∈  I s
c is uncertainty resolving, but c
is not branching on Γ  
*. Then |AI'(c)| < |A(c)|. So there has to be an
α  ∈  A(c) such that α  is not in A I'(c); and h in some I'' ∈  I s
c such that
(c, α ) = h. But then c is branching.Suppose next that I'  ∈   I s
I is uncertainty resolving, but I  is not
branching on Γ  
*. Now we know that |I'| < |I|. This means that | AI'(c)| < |
AI(c)| (see the proof of Corollary 3). Then there is α  ∈  AI(c)which is not in
AI'(c)  and there is I''  ∈   I s
I such that α   ∈   AI'''(c). But then I has to be
branching. 4. Associated Perfect Recall Problems and Optimal Extended
Strategies
The main question asked in this paper is whether extended strategies could
provide an optimal solution to Bayesian imperfect recall problems. In order
to be able to assess whether a candidate extended strategy is optimal or
not, we have to first define perfect recall problems associated to these
imperfect recall problems, to serve as the appropriate benchmark. Then the
criterion of optimality can be expressed in terms of the optimal simple
strategy for the associated problem.
4.1. Construction of Associated Perfect Recall Problems
So let us first introduce the concept of an associated perfect recall problem.
Consider the extensive form δ  of a Bayesian imperfect recall problem.
Below, I show the construction of δ , the extensive form of its associated
perfect recall problem. But again, we let extensive forms represent a whole
problem, so that δ  will stand for the whole associated perfect recall
problem.
    The first requirement this associated perfect recall problem has to meet
is that its information partition Î is a coarsest refinement of I in δ  which
makes δ  a Bayesian perfect recall problem. Note that there could be δ -s for
which there is a coarsening of I which make it a perfect recall problem, a
simple example of this is on Figure 6.
Further, an associated perfect recall problem has to be constructed
according to the following procedure which imitates the steps in the
characterization of Bayesian perfect recall problems in subsection 3.1. So:if the problem has no chance vertex in it, then make each information set
singleton. Next consider the set s(c) and the corresponding partition, I s
c.
Refine this partition so that it meets the requirements for perfect recall
problems inscribed in Lemmas 1 to 4, and call this partition Î s
c. Next
consider ∪ I∈ Î s
c
 I s
I  and refine its members so that they meet the appropriate
requirements. Repeat this until each of the terminal histories are reached.
This finishes the description of the procedure.
By its nature, the procedure forces a refinement of some of the
members of the original partition. Since the original problem δ  featured
imperfect recall, it is guaranteed that at least one I ∈  I is refined. Then the
resulting information partition Î will contain information sets which are
proper subsets of the original information partition I. Now we demand that
the labels of information sets in Î mark both the original information set
refined and the identity of the members of the new partition. So consider
an Ii ∈  I. Then find Î ∈  Î such that ∀ h ∈  Î, h ∈  Ii. Then relabel Î as I'i, I i
'' ∈
Î. If you can find more such Î, then relabel them as I i
''', I i
'''' and so forth.
Collect the findings in the subpartition Ii ⊂ Î. Now, clearly, there will be at
least one Ii which is non-singleton. (See Figure 1-b.)
4.2. Optimal Extended Strategies
It remains to define what an optimal extended strategy is for an imperfect
recall decision problem δ . First, construct the associated perfect recall
problem δ  to any decision problem δ , which may be unique. Then for δ  find
the optimal strategy σ
* for it, and then construct the appropriate Î
* and  Γ
*.Recall that an extended strategy for the problem δ  is in essence a
function θ  : I ×  Σ  →  Α  ×  Σ , where I is in δ  = 〈 H, R, I〉  and Σ  is the set of
simple strategies. Denote by θ
* an extended strategy which can induce in δ
the outcome which is induced by σ
* in δ . Note that it may not exist. This
extended strategy θ
* is called then the optimal extended strategy for δ .
Now the set Σ
* ∈  Σ  is the set of strategies which are actually involved in
the domain of θ
*.
Consider now the constructs IE
*  and Γ E
* , where the subscript E refers
to 'extended strategy'. IE
* is the same as Î
* except that each member Î of a
given Ii receives the label Ii. We say that Î corresponds to Ii. This means
that information sets on Γ
* get back the label they had in the original
problem δ . This,  a fortiori, defines the implementation graph Γ E
*  as well.
(This is illustrated on Figures 1-c.)
It is enough to study the objects Γ E
*  and Γ
* in order to assess what the
optimal extended strategy should be for a given problem. The main
requirement for optimality is that whenever the optimal simple strategy σ
*
for δ  prescribes a certain action for an information set Î in Î, then in θ
*, the
valid strategy at given information set Ii on Γ E
* corresponding to that Ii
should prescribe the same action for Ii. The main source of the difficulty in
constructing optimal extended strategies is that at any given time in the
course of the decision problem, there could be only one valid strategy
prescribed by the optimal extended strategy and this valid strategy has to
prescribe the same action for any information set with the same label Ii.
The following proposition will play a crucial role in the first two
theorems in Section 5:PROPOSTION 1: On Γ E
* , no two immediate successors of a branching
information set has labels referring to the same Ii in I of δ .
Proof: Note first that the information sets on Î
* have all different
labels. Now on Γ
*, if the chance vertex is branching, then its immediate
successors are uncertainty resolving by Lemma 8.
So consider that the chance vertex c on Γ E
* , is branching, and assume
that there are at least two information sets in I s
c whose label refers to the
same  Ii in I of δ . This means that these two information sets I i
' , I i
''on
Γ E
*   are proper subsets of an Ii on the original Γ , as it has been clarified
above. Recall the construction of associated perfect recall problems in
subsection 4.1. We arrived at Î
* by refining I. By Lemma 1, each
information set is made multi-staged in δ
c. Now suppose that I i
' was
separated from I i
'' because it did not meet multi-stagedness, then it can be
in I s
cat all. Since there is no other reason why the procedure would have
called for a separation of it from I i
'', there can be no two distinct I i




Next take a branching information set I on Γ E
* , and assume that there
are at least two information sets in I s
I whose label refers to the same Ii in I
of δ . The procedure in 4.1 first makes each information set multi-staged by
Lemma 1. Also, each information set in I s
I are contained in δ
I by Lemma 3.
Finally, if σ
*(I) = ai then each I' ∈  I s
I is contained in δ ai by Lemma 4. And
the procedure does not call for further refinement. By a reasoning
analogous to the one in the previous paragraph, if I i
'  was separated from I i
''
because it did not meet any of the previous four requirements then itcannot be in I s
I on Γ E
* . If the separation was either because of not meeting
multi-stagedness, or because of not meeting containment in δ
I, or finally
because of not meeting containment in δ ai – then I i
'  cannot be among the
immediate successors of I. If the separation was because of not meeting
containment in δ ai whenever σ
*(I) = ai, then it cannot be the immediate
successor of I on Γ E
* . And again, since there is no other reason why the
procedure would have called for a separation of I i
'  from I i
'', there can be no
two distinct
 I i
' , I i
'' among I s
I. 
5. Results
The aim of the formal analysis undertaken in this paper was to provide
solutions for Bayesian imperfect recall decision problems. Solving such a
decision problem means here the implementation of the best course of
action discernible in the phase when the decision maker is confronted with
problem, which amounts to the imposition of the formal criterion that an
optimal extended strategy should be found to a given imperfect recall
decision problem of the kind considered here. In a series of steps, we
derived the associated perfect recall problem δ  to each Bayesian imperfect
recall problem δ . And it was suggested that it is enough to study the
objects Γ E
*  and Γ
* in order to tell whether there is an optimal extended
strategy for a given problem. The main requirement of optimality was
clarified in subsection 4.2 above.5.1. Existence Theorems
While it is not true that extended strategies can solve each and every
Bayesian imperfect recall problem, we can still make the assertion that
there is indeed an optimal extended strategy for a great many of them. So
let us first consider:
9
THEOREM 1: There is an optimal extended strategy for each Bayesian
imperfect recall decision problem which does not feature absent-
mindedness.
Proof: Consider, for a given Bayesian problem, a candidate optimal
extended strategy θ
*. Suppose for a contradiction that there is an
information set Ii in I E
*  on Γ E
*  for which the valid strategy at that Ii, σ ν
*∈  Σ
*
say, prescribes a different action than what the optimal simple strategy
prescribes for the corresponding information set Î in Î on Γ
*. That is Î:
σ ν
*(Ii) ≠  σ ν
*(Î).
Consider first the case when the immediate predecessor set of Ii, p(Ii),
is empty. Then nothing could have prevented the formulation of an initial
strategy for the optimal extended strategy at the outset, so that this initial
strategy would coincide with what σ
* would prescribe for the
corresponding Î.
Next, if there is indeed at least one immediate predecessor of Ii, and it
is not the chance vertex, then call it I'. Suppose first that I' is not
branching. By hypothesis, it cannot be the case that Ii and I' originate in the
same information set of the original problem. So, again, nothing could
have prevented the updating of the optimal extended strategy at I' so that it
                                                
9 Notice that in the proof below the symbols I' and Ii designate two different ways of
distinguishing an information set from I.would coincide with what σ
* would prescribe for the corresponding Î. If
the immediate predecessor is the chance vertex, and it is not branching,
then, again, nothing could have prevented the formulation of an initial
strategy for the optimal extended strategy at the outset, so that this initial
strategy would coincide with what σ
* would prescribe for the
corresponding Î.
So consider next the case when there is at least one immediate
predecessor I' of Ii, and it is branching. From Proposition 1 we know that
no two immediate successors of I' can belong to the same Ij. Therefore no
immediate successor of I' other than Ii can belong Ii. Note that it still could
not be the case that Ii and I' originate in the same information set of the
original problem. Then again, nothing could have prevented the updating
of the optimal extended strategy at I' so that it would coincide with what σ
*
would prescribe for the corresponding Î. Finally, consider the case when
the immediate predecessor of Ii is the chance vertex, and it is branching.
From Proposition 1 we also know that no two immediate successors of c
can belong to the same Ij. Then again, nothing could have prevented the
formulation of an initial strategy for the optimal extended strategy at the
outset, so that this initial strategy would coincide with what σ
* would
prescribe for the corresponding Î.
We conclude that at any information set I on Γ E
* , the candidate optimal
extended strategy θ
* could have induced a valid strategy for I, so that its
prescription coincides with the prescription of σ
* for the corresponding
information set on Γ
*. Thus there is an optimal extended strategy for each
Bayesian imperfect recall decision problem. The next statement concerns a subclass of Bayesian decision problems
with absent-mindedness. Let us first define this subclass:
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DEFINITION 3: Bayesian decision problems with absent-mindedness in
which ∀  I ∈  I, for which ∃  h, h' ∈  I such that h' ∈  S(h), it is true that |I| =
2: are called Bayesian decision problems with binary absent-mindedness.
Then we have:
THEOREM 2: There is an optimal extended strategy for each Bayesian
imperfect recall decision problem with binary absent-mindedness.
Proof: Consider, for a given Bayesian problem with binary absent-
mindedness, a candidate optimal extended strategy θ
*. Suppose for a
contradiction that there is an information set Ii in I E
*  on Γ E
* , for which the
valid strategy at that Ii, σ ν
* ∈  Σ
* say, prescribes a different action than what
the optimal simple strategy prescribes for the corresponding information
set Î in Î on Γ
*. That is Î: σ ν
*(Ii) ≠  σ
*(Î).
Consider first the case when the immediate predecessor set of Ii, p(Ii),
is empty. Then nothing could have prevented the formulation of an initial
strategy for the optimal extended strategy at the outset, so that this initial
strategy would coincide with what σ
* would prescribe for the correspon-
ding Î.
Next, if there is indeed at least one immediate predecessor of Ii, and it
is not the chance vertex, then call it I'. Suppose first that I' is not
branching. Now it still could be the case that Ii and I' originate in the same
information set of the original problem. By Definition 3, there is no other
label on the implementation graph which is a predecessor of Ii and would
                                                
10 I would like to thank Joe Halpern for most important comments concerning theoriginate in the same information set at the same time. So, again, nothing
could have prevented the updating of the optimal extended strategy at I' so
that it would coincide with what σ
* would prescribe for the corresponding
Î. If the immediate predecessor is the chance vertex, and it is not
branching, then, again, nothing could have prevented the formulation of an
initial strategy for the optimal extended strategy at the outset, so that this
initial strategy would coincide with what σ
* would prescribe for the
corresponding Î.
So consider next the case when there is at least one immediate
predecessor I' of Ii, and it is branching. From Proposition 1 we know that
no two immediate successors of I' can belong to the same Ij. Therefore no
immediate successor of I'  other than Ii can belong Ii. Also, repeat the
reasoning about the cardinality of Ii: it could still be the case that Ii and I'
originate in the same information set of the original problem, but by
Definition 3, there is no other label on the implementation graph which is a
predecessor of Ii and would originate in the same information set at the
same time. Then again, nothing could have prevented the updating of the
optimal extended strategy at I' so that it would coincide with what σ
*
would prescribe for the corresponding Î. Finally, consider the case when
the immediate predecessor of Ii is the chance vertex, and it is branching.
From Proposition 1 we also know that no two immediate successors of c
can belong to the same Ij. Then again, nothing could have prevented the
formulation of an initial strategy for the optimal extended strategy at the
outset, so that this initial strategy would coincide with what σ
* would
prescribe for the corresponding Î.
                                                                                                                                              
following theorem.We conclude that at any information set I on Γ E
* , the candidate optimal
extended strategy θ
* could have induced a valid strategy for I, so that its
prescription coincides with the prescription of σ
* for the corresponding
information set on Γ
*. Thus there is an optimal extended strategy for each
Bayesian imperfect recall decision problem with binary absent-
mindedness. 
The above proofs are based on an indirect reasoning, in the sense that
they do not deliver a direct characterization of the optimal extended
strategy for given problems. For a specific example of how optimal
extended strategies could solve an imperfect recall decision problem in our
sense, consider the problem reported in Section 1. Again, Figure 1-a
exhibits this multi-stage problem without absent-mindedness and
precedence reversal, albeit note that it is not of perfect recall of
information sets. Its associated perfect recall problem is indicated on
Figure 1-b. If the initial chance move is {l}, the decision maker wants to
reach gains 6; if it is {r}, he wants to get to where utility 4 is given to him.
The implementation tree for this problem is exhibited on Figure 1-c. One
optimal extended strategy prescribes the initial strategy σ  0 as follows: σ
0(I1) = σ  0(I2) = {D}, σ 0 (I3) = {L}. If the problem reaches I1, no updating is
necessary. But if it reaches I2, then there a new strategy σ 1 should be made
valid, for which: σ 1 (I1) = σ 1 (I2) = {D}, σ 1 (I3) = {R}. And there is an other
optimal extended strategy symmetrical to the previous one.
It remains to be shown what is the range of problems which can be
solved by extended strategies
11. But note that the problems covered by the
above theorems include each case mentioned in the Piccione–Rubinstein[1994]. – For a Bayesian problem which cannot be solved by extended
strategies, examine the example on Figure 7. Here no optimal extended
strategy can achieve an "exit" at the right time, at h3. This example
provides a partial explanation of why we have considered only binary
absent-minded problems in this subsection. But it is clear that there may be
optimal extended strategies for non-binary problems as well. What is at
stake is that no three labels for a given information set would appear on a
branch of the implementation graph which are immediate successors of
each other.
5.2. Optimal Extended Strategies for Problems with Regular Perfect
Recall of Information Sets
In this subsection, we will examine the properties of the optimal extended
strategies for one specific class of Bayesian problems, those with regular
perfect recall of information sets. This is an important case, since it is the
only identifiable class of problems which features neither cross-branch
relevance, nor absent-mindedness. We have made preparations for this
examination in subsection 3.3, where the extensive form of these problems
were characterized. That work will now support the proof of the following
statement:
LEMMA 9: No label on the implementation graph of a Bayesian problem
with regular perfect recall of information sets occurs twice.
Proof:  Suppose for a contradiction that there is indeed a label which
appears twice on the implementation graph. Denote these by I i
'  and I i
'',
                                                                                                                                              
11 See Halpern (1996) for a similar theorem which addresses the class of problems in
which we do not find chance histories.respectively. This means that the construction of the associated perfect
recall problem led to the refinement of the information set Ii.
Recall first that in these problems each information set has to be multi-
staged, and recognize that, trivially, Ii cannot be the root of the decision
tree. Also, neither I i
'  nor I i
'' can be immediate successors of the chance
vertex on the implementation graph, since by the characterization of these
problems, Ii would not then be refined by the procedure of constructing the
associated perfect recall problem (see subsection 3.3).
Note next that I i
'  and I i
'' cannot have the same immediate predecessor
on the implementation graph by Proposition 1. But we can affirm then that
the problem cannot be that of regular perfect recall of information sets. To
see this, note that on the basis of the characterization of these problems, we
can state that the only reason why Ii could have been refined in the first
place by the procedure is that the condition of Lemma 4 did not hold, that
is (without loss of generality) ∃ h ∈  I i
'  and ai part of h, such that I i
'  is not
contained in δ ai. But then recall that the implementation graph records the
actions which are demanded by the optimal simple strategy for the
associated problem. So if it was the case that σ
*(Ij) = ai', then only one of
I i
' or  I i
'' could have been part of the implementation graph. So the
supposition led to a contradiction. 
Now we can state the existence of optimal extended strategies for this
class, and their main property:
THEOREM 3: There is an optimal extended strategy for each Bayesian
problems with regular perfect recall of information sets. Further, there is
no need for updating the initial strategy in that optimal extended strategy.This can be reformulated as the proposition that for this class, simple
strategies can attain the first best.
Proof: The first part follows from the conjunction of Theorem 1 and
the fact that problems with regular perfect recall of information sets do not
feature absent-mindedness by Definition 2.
For the second part, note that we can construct optimal extended
strategies here as follows. Take the optimal simple strategy σ
* for the
associated problem. Find the correspondence between the labels appearing
on the implementation graph and the original information sets. This
correspondence is bijective by the above Lemma 9. Then render the same
actions for the initial strategy in the optimal extended strategy to the
information sets which have counterparts on the implementation graph, as
the optimal simple strategy rendered to the labels appearing on that graph.
Then do not prescribe any further updating in the optimal extended
strategy. 
This result is useful at least for the reason that it marks out the fact that
the solution of imperfect recall problems without cross-branch relevance or
absent-mindedness do not require the use of generic extended strategies.
Time inconsistency can be overcome by simply following the strategy
constructed at the phase when the problem was originally introduced.
Finally, let us illustrate the above result by means of a simple example,
shown on (see Figures 2-a, b, c). This problem is of perfect recall of
information sets. Here the initial strategy should prescribe {l} for the first
information set and {L} for the second; and that is it. There is no need for
updating.6. Concluding Remarks
A lot of work remains to be done before a more complete assessment of
what extended strategies are able to achieve can be made. More
specifically, one wishes to identify the precise range of problems for which
the optimal extended strategies can achieve the first best, in the sense
clarified above. This should be accompanied by an analysis of the
properties of optimal extended strategies for individual classes of
imperfect recall problems. Also, there is a legitimate interest in higher
order extensions of the standard strategy concept, in which what have been
called extended strategies could be updated as well (see Halpern [1995]).
These could solve problems like that on Figure 7. These could be regarded
just as much a straightforward and legitimate extension of the original
concept as the one reported here. However, given their increasing
complexity, their employment may overstrain the resources of a decision
maker.
Finally, let me mention certain other issues which should be taken up
by future studies of imperfect recall problems. First, it seems that the
precise relationship between the representation of decision problems (and
games) by means of histories, as in Osborne–Rubinstein [1994] and
Piccione–Rubinstein [1994], and by graph-theoretical concepts should be
further clarified. Second, one should devote more attention to the ideas
developed in the early stages of game theory, as they relate to the problem
of imperfect recall. It seems to be especially worthwhile to address the
original formulation of games in von Neumann and Morgenstern ([1944],
[1947]), and that of Thompson [1953] and Isbell [1957], in this regard.Third, the connections of the current account of imperfect recall decision
problems to the standard model of game theory, on the one hand, and the
framework proposed by Maskin and Tirole [1994] on the other, should be
also explored. Fourth, and this is most important, a full engagement with
the study of game theory with imperfect recall seems to be most promising;
especially since this would enable us to construct models which can
capture the phenomenon of forgetting in economic situations. Finally,
situations when preferences changes may interact with forgetting should be
also addressed. See the preliminary remarks on this issue in my [1996: §§
35–37], paper.References
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